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Terrorism on the Playground:1 What Can Be
Done?
A terrorist is running rampant in America's schools. It knows no
racial, ethnic, or religious boundaries and causes severe emotional
harm to its victims. The schools are aware of its existence; how-
ever, the terror goes largely unchecked. Effects of its reign are
profound and lasting, with dire consequences for the victims. Sta-
ble, confident, and academically successful students are psycholog-
ically and academically crippled while the schools stand by and
watch. This terrorist is creating an enormous problem for Ameri-
can children and it is only recently that schools and society alike
have begun to recognize its existence. This terrorist is peer sexual
harassment.
Over the past few years, American society has been told that
sexual harassment will not be tolerated; but this message has been
almost exclusively geared toward the work environment. Now that
society has been informed about sexual harassment, many people
have begun to realize that it no longer is limited to the employ-
ment context. In fact, sexual harassment is thriving in America's
schools. It exists in a form that would never be tolerated in the
workplace today and, yet, very few are doing anything to curb its
growth. Children are forced to deal with situations2 that many
adults could not handle, and are suffering severe emotional and
academic problems as a result.
This comment attempts to accomplish three things by address-
1. Andrea Atkins, Sexual Harassment in School: Is Your Child at Risk? BETTER
HOMES AND GARDENS, Aug. 1992, at 32, 34 (quoting Nancy Stein, Ed. D., of the Wellesley
College's Center for Research on Women, Wellesley, Mass. in which she called peer sexual
harassment "terrorism on the playground.").
2. Students have reported the following in a recent survey conducted by Seventeen
magazine:
You're walking down the hall and a guy comes up behind you and snaps your bra or
even gropes your breast; a guy leers at you, grabs his crotch Marky-Mark-style, and
says, "Do me"; ... your name shows up on a list being passed around labeled "Piece
of ass of the week"; you are cornered by a guy who whispers obscenely about what he
wants to do to you. Some of you even reported being assaulted or raped.
Adrian Nicole LeBlanc, Harassment at School: The Truth Is Out, SEVENTEEN, May, 1993, at
134, 134.
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ing the problem of sexual harassment among students. First, it will
establish that sexual harassment is a pervasive problem in
America's schools. Second, this comment will discuss the law of
sexual harassment focusing on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19643 ("Title VII") and Title IX of the Educational Amendments
Act of 1972" ("Title IX") with an eye toward establishing whether
a cause of action exists under Title IX for student-to-student sex-
ual harassment. Finally, it will suggest alternative solutions,
namely policies and procedures that schools can adopt and follow
in order to protect children from sexual harassment and to insulate
themselves from liability.
I. THE PROBLEM
The reports of sexual harassment among students are growing
and the behavior reported is astonishing. In one case, a five-year
old Minnesota boy led a female classmate into the art resource
room, pulled down both of their pants, jumped on top of her and
began to simulate sexual intercourse.5 Boys are snapping girls' bras
and grabbing girls' breasts as they walk down the hall.' Lists are
being circulated of the twenty-five girls the boys would most like
to have sexual intercourse with;7 and, in one elementary school,
every Friday is "Flip-up Day," when the boys pull up the girls'
skirts.' While these isolated incidents may not be sufficient to es-
tablish the existence of a problem, recent studies also indicate that
sexual harassment in the schools is on the rise.
One study, commissioned by the American Ass-ociation of Uni-
versity Women Educational Foundation ("AAUW"),9 indicated
that four out of five, or eighty-one percent, of the students, in
grades eight through eleven have experienced some form of sexual
harassment 0 while in school," and, not surprisingly, the majority
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
5. Ruth Shalit, Romper Room: Sexual Harassment- By Tots, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 13.
6. LeBlanc, cited at note 2, at 134.
7. Atkins, cited at note 1, at 32.
8. Id. at 34.
9. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION,
HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(1993) [hereinafter HOSTILE HALLWAYS].
10. Sexual harassment was defined as "unwanted and unwelcome sexual behavior
which interferes with your life. Sexual harassment is not behaviors that you like or want."
HOSTILE HALLWAYS, cited at note 9, at 6 (emphasis omitted).
11. Id. at 4-5. The survey asked the students the following question:
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of the students who were harassed were victims of peer sexual har-
assment.12 Additionally, the survey indicated that the first time a
student is most likely to be harassed is during the formative junior
high school years, or between sixth and ninth grade,13 and that the
harassment is taking place primarily in the hallways and
classrooms."'
Even more appalling than the fact that the conduct exists is the
effect that it has on its victims. The AAUW survey indicated that
many students, following a harassing incident, did not want to at-
tend school and suffered embarrassment and loss of self-confi-
dence.1 5 Twenty-three percent of the students reported that they
did not want to talk as much in class following the experience,"6
and, emotionally, nearly sixty-three percent of the girls harassed
suffered embarrassment as a result of the conduct. 17 On the whole,
During your whole school life, how often, if at all, has anyone (this includes students, teach-
ers, other school employees, or anyone else) done the following things to you when you did
not want them to?
Li Made sexual comments, jokes, gestures, or looks.
Li Showed, gave, or left you sexual pictures, photographs, illustrations, messages, or
notes.
Li Wrote sexual messages/graffiti about you on bathroom walls, in locker rooms, etc.
Li Spread sexual rumors about you.
Li Said you were gay or lesbian.
Li Spied on you as you dressed or showered at school.
Li Flashed or "mooned" you.
[] Touched, grabbed, or pinched you in a sexual way.
Li Pulled your clothing in a sexual way.
Li Intentionally brushed against you in a sexual way.
Li Pulled your clothing off or down.
Li Blocked or cornered you in a sexual way.
Li Forced you to kiss him/her.
Li Forced you to do something sexual, other than kissing.
Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).
12. Id. at 11. Nearly four in five, or seventy-nine percent, of the harassed students
"have been targeted by a current or former student at the school-86% of the girls and 71%
of the boys." Id.
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id. at 13. Sixty-six percent of the harassed students have been harassed in the
hallway at least once, and more than fifty-five percent have been harassed in the classroom.
Id. Out of these groups, girls are overwhelmingly the most likely targets in these areas (sev-
enty-three percent of the girls compared with fifty-eight percent of the boys have been
harassed in the hallways; and sixty-five percent of the girls and forty-four percent of the
boys have been harassed in the classroom.). Id.
15. HOSTILE HALLWAYS, cited at note 9, at 15. Nearly one in four students, or twenty-
three percent, reported that they felt this way. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 16. Compare this to the fact that only thirty-six percent of the boys suf-
fered embarrassment. Id.
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the study indicated that the girls were more seriously affected than
the boys. This is illustrated by the statistics that the AAUW
presented. Compare the fact that fifty-two percent of the girls felt
self-conscious after they were subjected to harassing behavior with
the forty-three percent of the boys who felt the same way.18 Addi-
tionally, the girls tended to respond that they were "very upset" or
"somewhat upset" by the harassment more frequently than the
boys.19
What do these statistics mean? They clearly indicate that girls
are suffering emotional and psychological affects as a result of the
harassing behavior that schools are allowing to continue. These ef-
fects, in turn, have profound and lasting consequences on the stu-
dents' futures because during the crucial years of adolescence stu-
dents choose courses that will affect the development of their
careers. If a student has high self-confidence and esteem, then that
student will tend to engage in more challenging academic pursuits.
However, if a student lacks self esteem, that student will eventu-
ally begin to doubt his or her academic capabilities and opt for a
less challenging course of study, which in turn will lead to dimin-
ished career opportunities. In fact, in another study, the AAUW
found that "the educational aspirations and career goals of girls
and boys can be traced to a gender gap in self-esteem that widens
during their school years.""0 "Self-esteem shapes a person's ambi-
tions and actions. And low self-esteem shrinks a person's future.""1
18. Id. at 17.
19. HOSTILE HALLWAYS, cited at note 9, at 17. When asked how they felt immediately
following the harassment, seventy percent of the girls responded that they were "very up-
set" or "somewhat upset" as compared to only twenty-four percent of the boys. Id. One
sixteen-year old female stated that the harassing activity made her " 'feel that a woman
isn't worth much.'" Id. at 18. Another eighteen-year old female stated that "'[t]he experi-
ence was unnerving. I was rattled. I felt insecure and vulnerable at school, which should be a
safe place for learning.' "Id. at 22. Compare this with the response of a fifteen-year old male
who stated that the conduct "'[made [him] feel great that someone like[d] [him].'" Id. at
20. Another male, age fourteen, stated: " 'I don't care. People do this stuff every day. No one
feels insulted by it. That's stupid. We just play around. I think sexual harassment is nor-
mal.'" Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
20. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, SHORTCHANGING GIRLS, SHORT-
CHANGING AMERICA: A CALL TO ACTION 10 (1991) [hereinafter SHORTCHANGING GIRLS]. The
nationwide survey found that:
[sixty] percent of elementary school girls and 69 percent of elementary school boys
say that they're "happy the way I am"- a key indicator of self-esteem. By high
school, girls' self-esteem falls 31 percent to 29 percent, while boys self-esteem falls
only 23 percent to 46 percent- an increase from 7 points to 17 points in the gender
gap on this measure of self-esteem.
Id.
21. SHORTCHANGING GIRLS, cited at note 20, at 23. The AAUW states that:
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Therefore, by allowing sexual harassment to continue during this
crucial period, society is hindering the professional development of
thousands of young women.
Knowing the effects of sexual harassment, one would expect that
both the schools and the community would be outraged to hear
that it exists in the schools; however, this is not so. Take for exam-
ple an incident that occurred in Minnesota when fifteen-year old
Kathi Vonderharr and her parents filed charges against three
youths who had sexually assaulted Kathi.
22
The assault occurred when Kathi attended a youth hockey tour-
nament with a friend and her friend's family.23 Kathi, her friend,
and her friend's brother were in a motel room when several boys
knocked on the door.2' Her friend's brother knew the boys and let
them in.25 When Kathi was sitting on the bed, three of the boys
pulled up her blouse, pulled down her pants and began to fondle
her while the other boys watched.26 The boys finally left, but the
three who assaulted Kathi came back and again attacked her.
Kathi did not report this incident for a week, but upon learning
that the boys were bragging that they had had intercourse with
her, she told her parents who then filed charges.
28
Immediately following the filing of the charges,29 members of the
hockey association began to call the Vonderharrs to remind them
that "boys will be boys" and to convince them to drop the
charges.30 Even though two of the boys pled guilty to, and the
Low self-esteem leads to lack of self-confidence, which, in turn, leads to lowered aspi-
rations. And that makes someone aim lower and achieve less in school, in the work-
place, and throughout her life . . . . As girls grow up, they lose self-confidence in
their abilities, expect less from life, and lose interest in challenging courses of study
and rewarding careers, particularly pursuits involving mathematics and science.
Young girls are confident, assertive, and feel authoritative about themselves. But they
emerge from adolescence with a poor self-image, constrained views of their future,
and a lack of confidence in their abilities.
Id. at 23-24.
22. JoAnn Strauss, Peer Sexual Harassment of High School Students: A Reasonable
Student Standard and An Affirmative Duty Imposed on Educational Institutions, 10 LAW
& INEQUALITY 163, 164 (1992) (relying on Doug Grow, Suicide Ended Kathi's "Fight for
Dignity", MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, July 5, 1987, at 1A.).





28. Strauss, cited at note 22, at 163-64.
29. Two of the boys plead guilty to fourth degree assault and the third was found




other was found guilty of, fourth degree assault they became
"hockey heros" with articles appearing in the school and local
newspapers, and the yearbook. 1
On the other hand, Kathi was an outcast.32 Her classmates
taunted her by calling her a "slut," "bitch," and "whore. '3 3 Her
locker was vandalized and the vice principal of the school refused
to remedy the situation.3 Kathi endured these taunts until June
17, 1987, almost two years after the assault, when she committed
suicide at the age of eighteen.35 Given the reaction of the commu-
nity and the parents in this situation, it is understandable why
sexual harassment is rampant in America's schools.
When viewing peer sexual harassment then, one must keep in
mind not only the conduct of the perpetrator, but also the effect
on the victim and the potential reaction of the community and the
student body. The battleground for peer sexual harassment is not
pretty for its victim; but the only way that sexual harassment can
be stopped is to implement policies and procedures to protect the
victims, and punishment for those who choose to ignore its exis-
tence. Title IX has the potential to serve as a punishment for those
who choose to disregard sexual harassment as a pervasive problem
in the schools. It also will provide an incentive for schools to im-
plement their own policies and procedures for handling peer sexual
harassment.
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT DEFINED
Before any meaningful discussion of sexual harassment can be
undertaken, one must first understand what sexual harassment is.
Sexual harassment is a broad term that is used to encompass many
types of behavior.3 6 As such, it is difficult to formulate a precise
One caller said to Mrs. Vonderharr, 'Don't you remember when you were sixteen?
You liked that when boys did that to you. You may have slapped their face, but you
liked it .... My sons bring girls to the house all the time and I know they do that
and I know the girls like it.'
Id.
31. Id. "One article had the school hockey coach speaking of the two boys'
'hungry' and 'aggressive' styles." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Strauss, cited at note 22, at 164. " 'Kill the bitch, she took our friends to
court,' " appeared on Kathi's locker and the vice principal refused to take care of the
graffiti saying, "I've got 200 kids who were late for school. I've got to arrange their
detention. Clean the locker yourself." Id.
35. Id.
36. One commentator has said that:
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definition. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") has defined workplace sexual harassment as
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" which is made
a term or condition of employment, or as the basis for an employ-
ment decision.3 1 Such unwelcome conduct is also included as sex-
ual harassment if it "unreasonably interferes with an individual's
work performance" or creates "an intimidating, hostile or offensive
working environment. ' 38  The problem with sexual harassment
cases is that no single definition of sexual harassment is uniformly
used. However, the gravamen of sexual harassment is that it in-
volves "unwelcome conduct" of a sexual nature performed by one
who is in a position of power over the victim. 39 This power ex-
ploitation can be found not only in the employer/employee or
teacher/student context, but it has its origins in the general power
imbalance between men and women in society.'0 Therefore, any
Sexual harassment may range from verbal innuendo to overt conduct, from requests
for acquiescence in sexual relations to rape. Explicitly or implicitly threatened conse-
quences may or may not materialize following failure to comply with sexual demands.
Any viable definition of sexual harassment must be broad enough to encompass such
diversified behavior, but precise enough to establish clear standards of prohibited
conduct.
Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REV. 525,
533 (1987).
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992).
38. Id.
39. Several commentators have stated that sexual harassment is not so much about
sex as it is about the exploitation of power. See, e.g., Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive
Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1984) [hereinafter Abusive
Work Environment]. One commentator defines sexual harassment as:
[Tihe exploitation of a powerful position to impose sexual demands or pressures on
an unwilling but less powerful person. As an abuse of power that discriminates
against members of a discrete and vulnerable group, sexual harassment violates the
civil rights of its victims .. . [and] encompasses a broad range of behavior, from
unsolicited sexual comments to repeated sexual assaults.
Id. at 1451. See also Jolynn Childers, Note, Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in
the Law? A Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harass-
ment, 42 DUKE L.J. 854, 863-72 (1993). Ms. Childers states that "[tihe hostile environment
cases all contain this basic issue: Is [plower, by men over women, being used in a sexually
exploitative or discriminatory way in the workplace?" Id. at 871. Further, she states that
"[slexual harassment is less an issue about sex than it is an issue of power. It is an injury to
an individual in a specific context, but it is also an injury to a woman because she is a
member of a large group of 'women'." Id. at 870.
See also CATHARINE MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979) (de-
fining sexual harassment as "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context
of a relationship of unequal power.").
40. See Childers, cited at note 39, at 863; Abusive Work Environment, cited at note
39, at 1452.
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workable definition of hostile environment sexual harassment must
take into consideration not only the conduct itself, but also the
power differential between the harasser and the harassee.41
In 1981, the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education promulgated its own definition of sexual har-
assment.42 This definition, however, did nothing to protect the
rights of students to be free from peer sexual harassment and was
instead aimed at harassing conduct of employees or agents of a re-
cipient of federal financial assistance. There is no definition of stu-
dent-to-student sexual harassment currently in use. However, in
its 1993 survey, the AAUW defined peer sexual harassment as "un-
wanted and unwelcome sexual behavior which interferes with your
life." 43
Although there is no one definition of sexual harassment, the
federal courts and commentators have generally recognized two
distinct types of sexual harassment. Both types have been recog-
nized in the employment context under Title VII; however, under
Title IX, only one of these types is uniformly recognized.
The first category of sexual harassment is referred to as quid pro
quo harassment. This type of harassment occurs when one person
tries to compel another's submission to sexual demands by the
conditioning of a reward or punishment on the victim's submission
or failure to submit.4 4 "The coercion may be explicit or implicit."45
Quid pro quo harassment is uniformly accepted as a cause of ac-
tion under Title IX.
The second category of sexual harassment is what has been re-
41. This problem is a separate issue and has been written on extensively by several
commentators. This issue leads to such questions as "whose point of view is to be used in
analyzing the abusive conduct?" For an extensive discussion of what standard is to be uti-
lized in hostile environment cases, see Childers, cited at note 39; Abusive Work Environ-
ment, cited at note 39; Walter Christopher Arber, Note, A Step Backward For Equality
Principles: The "Reasonable Woman" Standard In Title VII Hostile Work Environment
Sexual Harassment Claims, 27 GA. L. REV. 503 (1993).
42. Monica L. Sherer, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under Title IX
for Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2126 (1993) (citing OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT'S NOT ACADEMIC 2 (1986)). The OCR
defines sexual harassment as follows: " '[slexual harassment consists of verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature, imposed on the basis of sex, by an employee or agent of a recipi-
ent that denies, limits, provides different, or conditions the provision of aid, benefits, ser-
vices or treatment protected under Title IX.' " Sherer, 141 U. PA. L. REV. at 2126 (quoting
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT'S NOT ACADEMIC 2
(1986)).
43. HOSTILE HALLWAYS, cited at note 9, at 6.
44. Schneider, cited at note 36, at 535.
45. Id.
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ferred to as "hostile" or "abusive" environment harassment. In the
academic context, an atmosphere is "hostile" when it becomes "so
hostile, offensive, or intimidating to the student that she is unable
to receive the full academic benefits to which she is entitled."" It
is under the hostile environment realm that peer sexual harass-
ment falls, and it is here that the courts are reluctant to extend
Title IX coverage.
Given that many of the Title IX cases have turned to the hostile
environment case law found under Title VII, one must first have a
general understanding of where hostile environment harassment
stands under Title VII before any discussion of Title IX can be
undertaken. The next section of this comment gives a brief over-
view of the Supreme Court cases in this area. 7
III. TITLE VII AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196448 was intended to pre-
vent discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, color, and
national origin in the workplace. It provides employees with reme-
dies for discrimination affecting the "terms, conditions, or privi-
leges" of their employment."9 While Title VII did not explicitly
provide for sexual harassment claims, the courts and the EEOC
have established that sexual harassment is a legitimate cause of
action under Title VII.
In 1980, the EEOC officially announced a set of guidelines defin-
ing "sexual harassment."5 These guidelines, although they do not
46. Id. at 536.
47. This comment does not attempt to fully develop the Title VII hostile environ-
ment cases. However, for a full discussion of the law as it stands under Title VII, see
Childers, cited at note 39; Joshua F. Thorpe, Gender-Based Harassment and the Hostile
Work Environment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1361 (1990); Abusive Work Environment, cited at note
39.
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
49. Title VII subsection (a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(1) (1991). The EEOC guidelines provide as follows:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII. Unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employ-
ment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
Comments 8071994
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have the effect of law,5' have been explicitly relied upon by the
courts in making sexual harassment decisions. The result has been
the recognition by both the guidelines and the courts of the two
categories of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile
environment.
The Supreme Court first recognized hostile environment sexual
harassment in 1986 when it decided the case of Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson.2 In Meritor, the plaintiff, a former employee of
the defendant bank, brought an action against the bank and her
supervisor alleging that she had been "constantly subjected to sex-
ual harassment" by her supervisor during the four years that she
had worked at the bank." Testimony indicated that, during the
course of the plaintiff's four year-term of employment, she had had
intercourse with her supervisor some forty or fifty times and that
the supervisor fondled her in front of other employees, exposed
himself to her, and on several occasions, raped her."
The Supreme Court first rejected the defendants' argument that
Title VII's focus was limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimi-
nation. 55 The Court found that "[t]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women'
in employment." 56 Additionally, the Court found that the EEOC
guidelines support the view that Title VII can be violated without
economic injury to the harassee"
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (footnote omitted).
. 51. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The Supreme Court stated
that: "As an 'administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency,' . . . these
Guidelines, 'while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute
a body of experience and informed judgment to which the courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance.' " Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (citations omitted).
52. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
53. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief in addition to com-
pensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees' Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 64.
56. Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))).
57. Id. at 65. The Court, in finding that hostile environment sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII, stated that:
[Tihe phrase "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" in [Title VIII is an
expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a
working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination . . . .One
can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as
to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group
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Although holding that hostile environment sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII, 58 the Court stated that in order for
such a claim to be actionable "it must be sufficiently severe or per-
vasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and
create an abusive working environment'." 59 The "voluntariness" of
the sex-related conduct, however, is not a defense to a sexual har-
assment action.60 "The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is
that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome'.""
The Meritor decision left open many questions in the hostile en-
vironment arena; namely, what must be proven before conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of em-
ployment and create an abusive work environment? 2 Recently, the
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether conduct, to be
actionable as hostile environment sexual harassment, must "'seri-
ously affect [an employee's] psychological well-being' or lead the
plaintiff to 'suffe[r] injury.' "63 The Court, in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., reaffirming Meritor, stated that the standard used
in determining whether conduct is sufficiently severe to alter the
conditions of employment is essentially a "middle path" between
workers ...
Id. at 66 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972)).
58. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73. The Court adopted the rationale of the Eleventh Circuit
when it stated that:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of
one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that
racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman
run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and
make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial
epithets.
Id. at 66-67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (lth Cir. 1982)).
59. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citations omitted). The Court found that the allegations
of the plaintiff in this case included conduct that was "not only pervasive harassment but
also criminal conduct of the most serious nature" and were "plainly sufficient to state a
claim for 'hostile environment' sexual harassment." Id.
60. Id. at 68.
61. Id. (emphasis added) ("The correct inquiry is whether [a plaintiff] by her conduct
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual partici-
pation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.").
62. One of the areas of confusion centers on what standard is to be used by the trier
of fact to evaluate the conduct and the resulting abusive work environment. Two different
standards are currently being implemented: the objective, gender neutral standard and a
gender-based or the reasonable woman standard. A discussion of the current arguments for
and against each standard is beyond the scope of this comment and will not be addressed.
For a detailed discussion of the differing standards see Childers, cited at note 39; Arber,
cited at note 39.
63. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (citation omitted).
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requiring "tangible psychological 'injury" and allowing recovery for
"any conduct that is merely offensive."6 In rejecting the district
court's requirement of tangible psychological harm, the Court
found that to require such harm in hostile environment cases
would go against the broad rule of workplace equality established
by Title VII.1 "So long as the environment would reasonably be
perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, . . . there is no
need for it also to be psychologically injurious."" s
While recognizing that the test that it had established was not
"mathematically precise," the Court stated that the determination
of whether a hostile environment exists is to be made by looking at
the totality of the circumstances. 7 Factors to be considered are:
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; the severity of the
conduct; whether the conduct is a mere offensive utterance or is
physically threatening or humiliating; and whether the employee's
work performance is unreasonably interfered with as a result.68 No
single one of these factors is required for determining that a hostile
work environment existed. 9
While Title VII and sexual harassment is fairly settled with re-
gard to the types of sexual harassment that are covered, i.e., quid
pro quo and hostile environment, this is not so for Title IX. Keep-
ing the above in mind, the next section of this comment will delve
into Title IX in an attempt to provide a background to the courts'
treatment of sexual harassment under this Title and will analyze
whether a legitimate cause of action for student-to-student sexual
harassment is available under Title IX.
64. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
65. Id. at 370-71. The Court found that:
Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.
A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect
employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from
advancing their careers. Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects, the
very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a
work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or
national origin offends title VII's broad rule of workplace equality.
Id.
66. Id. at 371.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371. The Court did not completely eliminate considering the
effect of such conduct on the employee's psychological well-being. Instead, it said that such




IV. TITLE IX AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Statutory History of Title IX
Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972 prohibits
sexual discrimination by any federally-assisted educational pro-
gram." Enacted in 1972 as a response to sex discrimination in edu-
cation, Title IX was designed to accomplish two distinct, but re-
lated, objectives.7 First, it was intended to deny federal financial
assistance to those education institutions that engage in sexually
discriminatory practices. 7 Second, Title IX was intended to pro-
tect individuals from such discrimination.73 The power to enforce
Title IX has been explicitly given to federal agencies and depart-
ments that have the ability to extend federal financial assistance to
educational activities or programs, with the Department of Educa-
tion (the "Department") being primarily responsible for enforcing
the statute. 74 Title IX also gives the Department the power to ter-
minate federal financial funding to institutions that violate the
statute.75 However, before such funding may be terminated, notice
of violation must be given to the offending institution.7 6 The De-
partment must also give the institution an opportunity to volunta-
rily remedy its noncompliance.7
The Supreme Court has noted that the first purpose of Title IX
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988). Title IX provides in pertinent part: "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance .... " 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
71. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
72. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704. Regarding Title IX, U.S. Representative Mink stated
that:
Any college or university which has [a] ... policy which discriminates against women
applicants . . . is free to do so under [Title IX] but such institutions should not be
asking the taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimination. Millions of
women pay taxes into the Federal treasury and we collectively resent that these funds
should be used for the support of institutions to which we are denied equal access.
Id. at 704 n.36 (citing 117 CONG. REc. 39,252 (1971)).
73. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704. U.S. Senator Bayh stated that "'[Title IX] is a strong
and comprehensive measure which. . . is needed if we are to provide women with solid legal
protection as they seek education and training for later years .... Id. at n.36 (quoting
118 CONG. REC. 5806-07 (1972)).
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988). Since the time of enactment of the Department of Edu-
cation Organization Act, the Department of Education is primarily responsible for granting
most of the federal financial assistance to educational institutions. Grove City College v.
Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 688 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).




is typically served through the termination of federal financial as-
sistance as provided for under the statute.78 However, because that
remedy is utilized only in rare circumstances, it does not ade-
quately accomplish Title IX's second objective of protecting the
individual.7 9 Therefore, in order to accomplish the goals of Title
IX, the Supreme Court, in Cannon v. University of Chicago,80
made clear that there is an implied private cause of action under
Title IX."'
Following Cannon, Title IX sex discrimination cases were few
because the Supreme Court, while allowing a private cause of ac-
tion, did not hold that compensatory relief was also available to
plaintiffs in a Title IX situation. This, however, has changed. In
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff could recover damages in an action brought to
enforce Title IX. 2 Through this decision, the Supreme Court has
potentially opened the flood-gates making Title IX a powerful
weapon against sex discrimination in an academic setting. How-
ever, many questions remain unanswered. Namely, does Title IX
apply to hostile environment harassment and, if so, what does a
plaintiff need to prove in order to recover for student-to-student
sexual harassment?
B. Title IX and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
While the recognition of quid pro quo sexual harassment has
been for the most part uneventful, s3 the extension of school liabil-
78. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
79. Id. at 705.
80. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
81. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705.
82. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992). Franklin resolved a conflict among the Third, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits regarding the issue of whether compensatory damages were available
under Title IX. Compare Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir.
1990); Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981); Franklin v. Gwin-
nett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990).
83. The Second Circuit was the first court to recognize quid pro quo harassment in
Title IX cases. In Alexander v. Yale University, the district court, while acknowledging that
quid pro quo harassment was recoverable, refused to extend hostile environment sexual har-
assment into the Title IX realm. 459 F. Supp. I (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 631
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980). The district court stated that:
[I]t is perfectly reasonable to maintain that academic advancement conditioned upon
submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education, just as
questions of job retention or promotion tied to sexual demands from supervisors have
become increasingly recognized as potential violations of Title VII's ban against sex
discrimination in employment . . . . When a complaint of such an incident is made,
university inaction then does assume significance, for on refusing to investigate, the
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ity into the hostile environment arena has not been as successful.
Courts facing the issue of whether hostile environment harassment
is recoverable under Title IX have been, for the most part, incon-
sistent. While the majority of the circuits appear to allow recovery
in this area, a few have not, and many have not addressed the issue
yet. This means that hostile environment sexual harassment is still
open for debate when it comes to Title IX recovery, particularly
when it involves student-to-student situations.
The first court to allow recovery for hostile environment sexual
harassment under Title IX was Lipsett v. University of Puerto
Rico.8 4 In Lipsett, the plaintiff was both an employee and a stu-
dent who alleged that hospital supervisory personnel had subjected
her to an atmosphere of sexual harassment at the hospital.8 5 The
First Circuit looked to Title VII for guidance in determining the
standard to be used in deciding Title IX sex discrimination cases.8 6
The court, however, limited its use of Title VII to the employment
context." In doing so, it recognized hostile environment sexual
harassment and stated that the plaintiff, to make out a case, must
show that his or her working or educational environment was al-
tered due to being subjected to unwelcome sexual advances that
were severe or pervasive. 8 The court essentially used the Meritor
test. Lipsett, however, is of limited use when looking at sexual har-
assment claims of students, but it is important because the court
relied upon the guidelines of the EEOC, and because it also implic-
itly ruled that Title IX prohibitions are coextensive with Title
VII's.8 9
The first federal court to specifically recognize hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment in a purely educational context was the
institution may sensibly be held responsible for condoning or ratifying the employee's
invidiously discriminatory conduct.
Alexander, 459 F. Supp. at 4. Rejecting recovery for hostile environment sexual harassment
under Title IX, the district court stated that "[n]o judicial enforcement of Title IX could
properly extend to such imponderables as atmosphere or vicariously experienced wrong
. .Id . at 3.
84. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
85. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 886.
86. Id. at 896-98. The court relied upon the EEOC guideline entitled "Procedures for
Complaints of Employment Discrimination Filed Against Recipients of Federal Financial
Assistance" and on the legislative history of Title IX "which strongly suggests that Congress
meant for similar substantive standards to apply under Title IX as had been developed
under Title VII." Id. at 897.
87. Id. at 897.
88. Id. at 898.
89. Id. at 896-97.
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District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Moire v.
Temple University School of Medicine.,, In Moire, the plaintiff
was a medical student at Temple University School of Medicine
from February of 1977 through May of 1982.91 She alleged that,
while in her third year at Temple, she failed her clerkship as a
result of certain incidents of sexual harassment perpetrated upon
her by her supervisor.2 She further blamed the failure on efforts of
colleagues and Temple faculty members to protect him. 3 The
plaintiff alleged that her supervisor's conduct toward her "created
a sexually harassing, discriminatory atmosphere" and that "Tem-
ple officials conspired to maintain such an environment in violation
of her rights . . .,,"
In reaching its decision, the court first defined sexual harass-
ment as " 'the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the
context of a relationship of unequal power.' "5 The conditioning of
academic advancement upon submission to sexual pressures, ac-
cording to the district court, constituted sexual discrimination in
the academic environment because "such treatment demeans and
degrades women." ' However, the court found that there was no
allegation of quid pro quo harassment in this case and determined
that the issue for resolution was whether the plaintiff was in a
harassing or abusive environment due to her sex.97 While the court
noted that "the sexual harassment 'doctrine' has generally been
developed in the context of Title VII," it found that the EEOC's
1980 Guidelines on Sexual Harassment were equally applicable in
a Title IX context." Therefore, the court affirmatively recognized
that both types of sexual harassment are actionable under Title
IX, becoming the first federal court to do so.
Until recently, Moire was the only federal decision holding that
hostile environment sexual harassment was proscribed by Title
IX.9  However, in July of 1993, the District Court for the Northern
90. 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), afi'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
91. Moire, 613 F. Supp. at 1362.
92. Id. at 1365.
93. Id. at 1362.
94. Id. at 1366.
95. Id. (citing CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1
(1979)).
96. Moire, 613 F. Supp. at 1366.
97. Id. at 1366-67.
98. Id. at 1366-67 n.2 (stating that "the [EEOC's] 1980 Guidelines on Sexual Harass-
ment explicitly recognize these two types of harassment . . . these guidelines seem equally
applicable to Title IX.") (citations omitted).
99. In 1989, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylva-
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District of California held that Title IX permits a plaintiff to state
a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment.10 In Patricia
H. v. Berkeley Unified School District, the plaintiffs, Patricia H.
and her two daughters, Jackie and Rebecca, alleged that the two
girls were subjected to a hostile educational environment due to
the continuing presence of a teacher who had sexually molested
them.' 1 They further alleged that the school district failed to ade-
quately respond to the situation and take the necessary steps re-
quired under Title IX.10 2 The court stated that the school district's
liability in this situation was based upon: (1) a finding of a hostile
environment; and (2) the school district's "knowing failure to
act."' The defendants argued that Title IX does not proscribe
hostile environment sexual harassment and, therefore, the legisla-
ture and not the court should act to extend the scope of Title
IX. 104 In reaching its determination that Title IX is applicable in
hostile environment cases, the court looked to Title VII, particu-
larly the court looked to Meritor and the recent Supreme Court
nia held that it is clear that Title IX reaches claims for quid pro quo sexual harassment but
stated that:
[T]o suggest ... that unwelcome sexual advances, from whatever source, official or
unofficial, constitute Title IX violations is a leap into the unknown which, whatever
its wisdom, is the duty of Congress or an administrative agency to take. Title IX
simply does not permit a "hostile environment" claim as proscribed for the workplace
by 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3).
Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139, 145 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd on other
grounds, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989).
100. Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
101. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1296. With regard to Rebecca's action, the complaint
alleged that because of the teacher's presence, Rebecca's school reports had shown a steady
decline "into scholastic failure." Id. at 1298. Rebecca also alleged that on occasion she saw
the teacher on school grounds while she was attending junior high in the Berkeley Unified
School District. Id. As a result, she fled both her school and her home, and was unable to
attend her regular school within the district. Id. She further alleged that her schooling was
disrupted due to these incidents and that she was forced to transfer out of the school into
private schools and eventually to special education programs due to her declining academic
performance. Id.
102. Id. at 1297.
103. Id. at 1297. The court stated that:
An employer is liable if it fails to take "immediate and appropriate" action "reasona-
bly calculated" to remedy the harm complained of .... Just as the Gwinnett school
district could be liable after Franklin complained and received no help, and Ellison's
employer could be liable for its subpar efforts on her behalf, the [Berkeley Unified
School District] may be liable if it failed to take reasonable steps to aid Jackie H. and
Rebecca H.
Id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992); Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)).
104. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1291.
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decision in Franklin.'10 The court specifically noted that, while
Franklin did not address the issue of the relationship between Ti-
tle VII and Title IX with regard to hostile environment sexual har-
assment, the Supreme Court did use the body of law under Title
VII to explain its ruling on the harassment claim.' The district
court found that "a student should have the same protection in the
school that an employee has in the workplace" and, also, relied
upon Title VII in reaching its decision.' °7
In developing a standard to be applied in academic hostile envi-
ronment cases, the court adopted the "reasonable victim" ap-
proach promulgated by the OCR.108 With regard to whether the
plaintiffs suffered from a hostile environment due to the molesta-
tion, the court found that the question of whether a reasonable
student of the .plaintiffs' ages would find the teacher's mere pres-
ence to create a hostile environment was a jury question and not
for the court to decide.
0 9
105. Id. at 1290-92.
106. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1292. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that:
-Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Schools the duty not to
discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate on the basis of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on
the basis of sex." ... We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually
harasses and abuses a student.
Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1307 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64).
107. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1292 (citing Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d
137, 149 (5th Cir. 1992) (decided under the Fourteenth Amendment)). The district court
opined that "Ithe distinctions between the school environment and the workplace serve
only to emphasize the need for zealous protection against sex discrimination in the schools
.. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1292-93. Furthermore,
Parents, guardians, and the children themselves have little choice but to rely on the
school officials for some measure of protection and security while in school and can
reasonably expect that the state will provide a safe school environment. To hold oth-
erwise would call into question the constitutionality of compulsory attendance stat-
utes, for we would be permitting a state to compel parents to surrender their off-
spring to the tender mercies of school officials without exacting some assurance from
the state that school officials will undertake the role of guardian that parents might
not otherwise relinquish, even temporarily.
Id. at 1293 n.6 (citing Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 147 (5th Cir. 1992)).
108. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at.1296, The OCR stated that:
[Wihen considering whether an actionable hostile environment has been created in an
educational setting, the determining body should consider "the age of the victim(s);
the frequency, duration, repetition, location, severity, and scope of the acts of harass-
ment; [and] the nature or context of the incidents," in essence using a "reasonable
student" standard.
Id. (quoting Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. N at 2).
109. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1297. Additionally, the court found that the liability
of the school district hinged upon a finding of fact regarding whether or not the school
district took appropriate action under the circumstances. Id. The court also refused to find
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The most recent case to allow recovery for hostile environment
sexual harassment under Title IX is Doe v. Petaluma City School
District."0 This case, however, went much further than recognizing
hostile environment claims under Title IX. It is also, and more im-
portantly, the first case to rule on whether a student may recover
against a school district for injuries sustained as a result of stu-
dent-to-student sexual harassment.
C. Doe v. Petaluma City School District
Until August of 1993, no court had ruled on the issue of whether
student-to-student sexual harassment is recoverable under Title
IX. However, in August, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California was faced with this issue for the
first time. Given that this is the first case of this type, a detailed
description of the decision is in order.
1. Facts
In mid-fall, 1990, the plaintiff, who was in the seventh grade in
the defendant school district, was first faced with the harassing ac-
tivity, which was manifested mainly through verbal actions."' The
harassment began when two male students approached the plain-
tiff and said "I hear you have a hot dog in your pants."1 2 Within a
few weeks after this initial comment, other students were ap-
proaching the plaintiff and rumors were spreading about the plain-
tiff and hot dogs.' In response to the verbal harassment, the
plaintiff spoke with her counselor, Mr. Homrighouse, and asked
him to stop the harassment." 4 Mr. Homrighouse did nothing."'
Over the course of the semester the plaintiff continued to endure
the rumors and verbal harassment, speaking with Mr.
that Rebecca and Jackie's claims were nonjusticiable. It stated that Rebecca's complaint was
not limited to prospective relief because considerable impact on Rebecca's life was alleged.
Id. at 1298-99. It said that Rebecca "should not be punished for a hostile environment so
severe that she was forced out entirely by loss of her legal claim against those responsible
for the situation." Id. at 1299. Furthermore, the court said that Jackie's complaint was not
moot even though she had already graduated. Id. at 1298. The court stated that the fact of
graduation only rendered Jackie's claim for prospective relief moot and not her claim for
damages. Id.
110. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).







Homrighouse approximately every other week. 1 6 During these
meetings, he failed to inform the plaintiff about the school's Title
IX Student/Parent Grievance Policy or tell the plaintiff about the
Title IX officer at the school; however, he did tell the plaintiff that
he could warn the students about the behavior.
117
As the harassment continued throughout the fall, the plaintiff's
father and mother spoke with Mr. Homrighouse about the situa-
tion.118 He told the plaintiff's parents that he was aware of the sit-
uation, and that he would take care of everything.' 9 He also stated
that some of the kids needed time adjusting to junior high and
that he expected the harassment to stop within a short time.'
20
Again, Mr. Homrighouse did not inform the plaintiff's parents
about the grievance procedure or about the Title IX coordinator. '2
The harassment continued to escalate throughout the semester,
and by December of 1990 the plaintiff's father was again forced to
speak with Mr. Homrighouse because the plaintiff was being
harassed by certain girls in her class who threatened her because
she had reported the harassment.122 Mr. Homrighouse spoke to
these girls and told the plaintiff's father that everything had been
taken care of; but the harassment continued.
23
In the spring of 1991, references were still being made with re-
gard to the plaintiff and hot dogs. 24 Once again the plaintiff re-
ported her concerns to Mr. Homrighouse and asked that he stop
the harassment by certain female students. 2 5 In response to the
plaintiff's request, Mr. Homrighouse stated that girls could not
sexually harass other girls, and, therefore, they could not get into
trouble. 2 ' He further told the plaintiff that all that he could do
was warn the students. 27 Mr. Homrighouse also told the plaintiff's









125. Id. at 1565. The female students continued to harass the plaintiff by calling her a
"hot dog bitch," "slut," and "hoe" in attempts to get the plaintiff to fight with them. Id.
When the plaintiff complained to Mr. Homrighouse he told her that "he could not stop the
girls from talking to [the plaintiff] because of their free speech rights." Id. Even though he
was aware that the plaintiff was upset and frightened, he once again did nothing to stop the
harassing activities. Id.




father, with regard to the harassment being perpetrated by the
boys, that "boys will be boys. "128
As the harassing behavior continued into the fall of 1991, the
plaintiff's eighth grade year, going to school became emotionally
difficult for the plaintiff, forcing her mother to again speak with
Mr. Homrighouse who stated that there was little that he could do
because no one had actually physically harmed the plaintiff.1 9 He
still did not inform the plaintiff's family about the Title IX griev-
ance policy or coordinator.'"0
In January of 1992, the plaintiff was slapped by another stu-
dent.13s This incident was the first to be reported to the school's
vice principal and Title IX coordinator."' However, the coordina-
tor was still not apprised of the situation fully until she attended a
meeting with the plaintiff's father and Mr. Homrighouse on Febru-
ary 21, 1992, following an incident that occurred during the plain-
tiff's English class.' 3 At this time the coordinator asked why she
had never been informed of the situation. Mr. Homrighouse indi-
cated that he "didn't feel it was important." ' s
Following this meeting,'35 the harassing incidents continued un-
til March of 1992 when the plaintiff's parents transferred her to
another public school.' 36 However, because the harassment contin-
ued there, the plaintiff was eventually forced to attend a private
girls' school at her parents' expense.'37




131. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. at 1565.
132. Id.
133. Id. Apparently, a young man in the plaintiff's class stood up and said: "This
question is for [the plaintiff]. Did you have sex with a hot dog?" Id. The teacher made the
student apologize to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff left the room in tears. Id.
134. Id. at 1565. Additionally, by this point, the plaintiff had stopped going to the
bathroom while at school because student-written comments were on the bathroom walls
everyday. Id.
135. Two additional incidents led to the eventual transfer of the plaintiff. On Febru-
ary 24, 1992, while buying her lunch in the school cafeteria, two boys commented about the
plaintiff's preference for Oscar Meyer hot dogs and whether the plaintiff wanted them
cooked or frozen. Id. This incident was reported to the Title IX coordinator who suspended
the boys for two days. Id. The second episode of harassment took place on February 28,
1992, when a female student approached the plaintiff and attempted to initiate a fight. Id.
School officials stepped in and the event was also reported to the coordinator. Id.
136. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. at 1566.
137. Id.
138. The plaintiff sued the Petaluma City School District, the Petaluma Joint Union
High School District, Richard Homrighouse, Kenilworth Junior High School, and the princi-
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to end the sexual harassment inflicted upon her by her peers.1"9
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims, ar-
guing among other things, that Title IX does not apply to hostile
environment sexual harassment, and that, even if Title IX did ap-
ply, the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendants intended to
discriminate against her.1"'
2. Holding
The court held that Title IX does apply to hostile environment
sexual harassment but stated that, for a plaintiff to recover dam-
ages, as opposed to declaratory or injunctive relief, she must "al-
lege and prove intentional discrimination on the basis of sex by an
employee of the educational institution."14 '
In addressing whether Title IX applies to hostile environment
claims, the court looked to the decisions of other federal courts on
the issue and made specific reference to the decision in Patricia H.,
which was decided by another judge in the same district. 2 The
district court stated Patricia H. relied upon four factors in reach-
ing its decision that Title IX applies to hostile environment sexual
harassment. First, it looked to the legislative history behind Title
IX which indicated that Title IX was patterned after Title VII.1"
Second, the district court noted that Patricia H. paid particular
pal of Kenilworth Junior High. Id. at 1560.
139. Id. at 1563.
140. Id. at 1571. Before reaching the Title IX claims, the court was forced to decide
whether or not the plaintiff's federal claims were timely filed. Given that Title IX does not
have its own statute of limitations, the court looked to the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure, as is required by the Supreme Court, to determine what the applicable statute of
limitation would be in Title IX cases. Id. at 1566 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261
(1985)). Under California law, the statute of limitation period applicable in Title IX situa-
tions is one year, therefore, the defendants claimed.that the plaintiff's cause of action was
time barred. Id. In finding that the cause of action was timely, the court stated that it could
not say, from the face of the complaint, that no violation of federal statute occurred within
one year from the time that the complaint was filed. Id. Additionally, the court found that,
because of the plaintiff's minor status, the federal claims were tolled under the California
Code of Civil Procedure § 35 2 (a)(1). Id. at 1569-70. Finally, the court held that the plaintiff
may have been able to proceed on a "continuing violation theory." Id. at 1567. The court
stated that "a plaintiff satisfies the statute of limitations if she shows 'a series of related
acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period, or the maintenance of a dis-
criminatory system both before and during the [limitations] period.'" Id. (citations
omitted).
141. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. at 1571. ("To obtain damages, it is not
enough that the institution knew or should have known of the hostile environment and
failed to take appropriate action to end it.").
142. Id. at 1571-73.
143. Id. at 1572.
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attention to the Supreme Court's reliance on Title VII in its deci-
sion in Franklin.4" Third, reference was made to other Title IX
employment discrimination cases that adopted Title VII stan-
dards.' 6 Finally, the court noted that Patricia H. also relied upon
the current policy of the OCR which applies Title VII standards to
Title IX claims.
146
While the court found that hostile environment harassment is
actionable under Title IX, it did note that no court has ever ruled
on the issue of student-to-student sexual harassment.'47 However,
the court looked to the opinions of the OCR and discovered that
the OCR believed, that "an educational institution's failure to take
appropriate response to student-to-student sexual harassment of
which it knew or had reason to know is in violation of Title IX."'' 5
The court then went on to generally state that Franklin was a hos-
tile environment case and that to deny recovery under the hostile
environment theory would "violate the Supreme Court's command
to give Title IX a sweep as broad as its language.' 49
Given the above, it was clear to the court that, in the situation at
bar,' 50 the plaintiff was "'denied a benefit[ ] of, or subjected to
discrimination under an education program on the basis of
sex.' "511 Based on its findings, the court held that hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment, including student-to-student harassment,
is a legitimate cause of action under Title IX; however, in order for
a private plaintiff to recover compensatory damages, intentional
144. Id.
145. Id. (citing Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); and
Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges and Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987)).
146. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. at 1572.
147. Id. at 1573.
148. Id. (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 1575. The court stated that:
Surely one is "denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under" an educa-
tion program on the basis of sex when, as alleged (in this case], she is driven to quit
an education program because of the severity of the sexual harassment she is forced
to endure in the program. That does not mean, however, that the educational institu-
tion will always be liable for damages as a result of hostile environment sexual harass-
ment. "Whether a litigant has a cause of action is 'analytically distinct and prior to
the question of what relief, if any, a litigant is entitled to receive.' "
Id. (quoting Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983)
(citations omitted)).
150. The court made it clear, however, that it did "not mean to indicate ... that an
actionable hostile environment does not exist unless the environment is so bad that the
victim feels compelled to quit the institution." Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. at
1575 n.10.
151. Id. (citation omitted).
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discrimination must be alleged and proven. 151
In reaching its decision that "intent" is a prerequisite in any Ti-
tle IX claim for damages, the court, noting that Title IX is to be
interpreted in a manner similar to that employed in Title VI
cases, 153 relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Guardians Asso-
ciation v. Civil Service Commission of New York.154 In Guardians
Association, the Supreme Court held that, under a Title VI cause
of action, a plaintiff must show discriminatory intent in order to
recover compensatory damages. 55 The Supreme Court limited re-
152. Id. at 1576.
153. Title VI provides: "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
"Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are often referred to as sister statutes
because they were modelled after one another and contain identical enforcement schemes."
Kelly S. Terry, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools: Reviving the Presumption of
Remedies Under Implied Rights of Action, 46 ARK. L. REv. 715, 733 (1993) (citations omit-
ted). "Because these three statutes were explicitly patterned after one another and share the
common objective of prohibiting discrimination by institutions that receive federal financial
assistance, courts have concluded that they are to be construed and applied in the same
manner." Id. at 734 (citations omitted).
154. 463 U.S. 582 (1983). Guardians Association involved an employment discrimina-
tion suit brought by minority members of a city police department. The complaint alleged
that the department's use of several written examinations to make entry-level appointments
had a discriminatory impact on the scores and pass-rates of minorities and were not job
related. Guardians Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 585. All of the plaintiffs in this case had passed the
exam and had been hired by the department. Id. However, because the plaintiffs were hired
in the order of test score, they had less seniority than similarly situated white police officers.
Id. Subsequently, the department was forced to lay off several officers and did so on a "last-
hired, first-fired" basis causing the minority officers to be laid off first. Id. The plaintiffs
filed a class action alleging violations of both Title VI and Title VII primarily challenging
the discriminatory impact of the examinations on minority officers. Id. at 586.
155. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. at 1574 (citing Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S.
582). The Supreme Court in Guardians Association found that Title VI was enacted pursu-
ant to the Spending Clause. The district court quoted Justice White who stated that:
[Tihe Court has more than once announced that in fashioning remedies for violations
of Spending Clause statutes by recipients of federal funds, the courts must recognize
that the recipient has 'alternative choices of assuming the additional costs' of comply-
ing with what a court has announced is necessary to conform to federal law or of 'not
using federal funds' and withdrawing from the federal program entirely ... I put
aside for present purposes those situations involving a private plaintiff who . . . has
been intentionally discriminated against by the administrators of the program. In
cases where intentional discrimination has been shown, there can be no question as to
what the recipient's obligation under the program was and no question that the recip-
ient was aware of that obligation. In such situations, it may be that the victim of the
intentional discrimination should be entitled to a compensatory award, as well as to
prospective relief in the event the State continues with the program."
Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. at 1574 (quoting Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 596-
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covery for unintentional violations of Title VI to injunctive re-
lief. 56 The district court believed that the same rule should apply
in Title IX cases because Title IX, like Title VI, is also a Spending
Clause statute and because it was based upon Title VI. 157 Further-
more, the court believed that the Supreme Court in Franklin laid
down the rule that recovery of damages under Title IX is limited
to claims for "intentional discrimination" and that respondeat su-
perior liability exists under Title IX so that an educational institu-
tion may be found to have intentionally discriminated when one Of
its agents is found the have done so. 158 Based on its reading of
these cases, the district court found that damages may not be re-
covered in a Title IX action unless a plaintiff can allege and show
that the school district intentionally discriminated against the stu-
dent on the basis of sex.
159
V. THE FUTURE OF TITLE IX AND STUDENT-TO-STUDENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
A. Is Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Recoverable
Under Title IX
When viewing the language of Title IX, one can clearly see that
97) (citations omitted).
156. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. at 1573 (relying on Guardians Ass'n, 463
U.S. at 582). What the district court failed to point out, however, is that Guardians Associa-
tion was a plurality opinion in which only five of the justices agreed that "intent" must be
proven in order for a Title VI plaintiff to recover compensatory damages. Guardians Ass'n,
463 U.S. at 582. Justice White wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor concurred in the judgment. Id. Justice Powell,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, filed a separate opinion concurring with
the judgment. Id. at 607 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also filed a separate con-
curring opinion. Id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, four justices dissented--
Justices Marshall, Stevens, Brennan and Blackmun. Justice Marshall filed his own separate
dissent, while Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun filed another. Id.
at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Id. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. at 1574.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1576. The court specifically stated that:
[N]o damages may be obtained under title IX (merely) for a school district's failure
to take appropriate action in response to complaints of student-to-student sexual har-
assment. Rather, the school district must be found to have intentionally discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff student on the basis of sex. The school's failure to take
appropriate action ... could be circumstantial evidence of intent to discriminate.
Thus, a plaintiff student could proceed against a school district on the theory that its
inaction (or insufficient action) in the face of complaints of student-to-student sexual
harassment was a result of an actual intent to discriminate against the student on the
basis of sex.
Duquesne Law Review
student-to-student sexual harassment violates this statute. Surely
one who is subjected day after day to such harassment is being
denied a "benefit of" or "subjected to discrimination under" edu-
cational program.160 As is indicated by the AAUW study discussed
above, students report that they feel self-conscious and unsure of
themselves following harassing behavior.161 This loss of self-confi-
dence, or esteem, can lead to impaired academic progress; which,
in turn, will eventually lead to diminished career goals and lower
earning potential, especially for women, who appear to suffer more
severe consequences than men who have been subjected to harass-
ment. 62 Clearly then, by ignoring sexual harassment among stu-
dents, a school, although not itself harassing the student, through
its inaction is effectively condoning activity that is specifically pro-
hibited by Title IX. 6s
Furthermore, while the courts are only beginning to address the
issue of recovery for hostile environment sexual harassment under
Title IX, there appears to be a developing trend to allow such re-
covery. This trend is being fed by the Supreme Court's implicit
allowance of recovery for hostile environment harassment in
Franklin. Patricia H. and Petaluma are the only cases that have
ruled on this issue since Franklin was handed down, and both
cases allowed recovery for hostile environment sexual harassment
basing their decisions upon the Supreme Court's posture, specifi-
cally, the Supreme Court's reliance on Meritor in deciding that
sexual harassment was sex discrimination for the purposes of Title
IX.16 4 By citing to Meritor, the Court can be viewed to have im-
plicitly approved, for Title IX purposes, at a minimum, the tests
for sexual harassment that were adopted in the Title VII case.
This means, therefore, that both quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment harassment can be legitimately found to be prohibited under
160. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988).
161. See HOSTILE HALLWAYS, cited at note 9, at 15. See also notes 12, 14-15, 19-21 and
accompanying text.
162. See notes 17, 19-21 and accompanying text.
163. Sherer, cited at note 42, at 2154.
164. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1992). Specifically
the Court stated:
Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Schools the duty not to
discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor discriminates on the
basis of sex." ... We believe that the same rule should apply when a teacher sexu-
ally harasses and abuses a student. Congress surely did not intend for federal monies
to be expended to support the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe.




Furthermore, as the court in Patricia H. noted,
[Tihe importance and function of environment is different in academia than
in the workplace . . . . A nondiscriminatory environment is essential to
maximum intellectual growth and is therefore an integral part of the educa-
tional benefits that a student receives. A sexually abusive environment in-
hibits, if not prevents, the harassed student from developing her full intel-
lectual potential and receiving the most from the academic program.'6 5
Given all of this, it is likely that courts will now follow the lead of
Patricia H. and Petaluma in allowing recovery under Title IX for
hostile environment sexual harassment.
B. What Will a Plaintiff Need to Show When Bringing a Claim
of Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment?
Given the posture of the lower courts and that of the Supreme
Court, the decision in Petaluma is the likely model that will be
adopted in student-to-student harassment cases by the majority of
courts that allow recovery for hostile environment sexual harass-
ment under Title IX. Therefore, by looking at Patricia H. and
Petaluma together, one can deduce what will need to be shown
under any student-to-student sexual harassment case.
When analyzing these cases, it appears that one will need first to
establish the existence of a "hostile educational environment.""16
In determining whether such an environment has been created, the
court must consider the "'age of the victim(s); the frequency, du-
ration, repetition, location, severity, and scope of the acts of har-
assment; [and] the nature or context of the incidents.' ",167 Second,
once such an environment is found to have existed, the court then
needs to determine whether the school took "'immediate and ap-
propriate' action 'reasonably calculated' to remedy the harm com-
plained of."'16 8 Finally, if the plaintiff seeks to recover compensa-
tory damages, as opposed to injunctive relief, the complaint will
need to allege that the school intentionally discriminated against
165. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1293 (quoting Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Har-
assment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REv. 525, 551 (1987)).
166. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1296.
167. Id. (quoting Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. N at 2). The court adopted a "rea-
sonable student" standard. This standard is also promulgated by the OCR. Id. For a de-
tailed discussion of whether or not a court in student-to-student sexual harassment cases
should use a "reasonable student" standard, see Strauss, cited at note 22.
168. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1297 (citations omitted).
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the plaintiff on the basis of sex.1 69 Intentional discrimination may
be shown circumstantially merely by the school's failure to take
appropriate action. 7 ' "Thus, a plaintiff student could proceed
against a school district on the theory that its inaction (or insuffi-
cient action) in the face of complaints of student-to-student sexual
harassment was a result of an actual intent to discriminate against





VI. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO ENDING PEER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT - STATE LEGISLATION
In an attempt to end sexual harassment in the schools, several
states have enacted legislation specifically dealing with the situa-
tion. Minnesota was the first state to break ground in this area
when it amended its discrimination statute to include "unwelcome
sexual advances" or "physical conduct or communication of a sex-
ual nature" that creates "an intimidating, hostile, or offensive...
environment" at work or in school.1 72 Subsequently, Minnesota
also passed a law requiring school boards to adopt sexual harass-
ment policies.1 73 A definition of sexual harassment, along with re-
porting procedures and penalties for violations must be set forth in
these policies. 74
In California, a law similar to Minnesota's went into effect on
January 1, 1993. California's law defines peer sexual harassment as
"unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other
verbal, visual or physical conduct of a sexual nature" that are se-
vere enough to impact negatively on an individual's academic per-
formance or to create "an intimidating, hostile or offensive . . .
educational environment."'7 5 While the two statutes are aimed at
preventing the same behavior, one big difference exists between
the two: California's law covers only students in the fourth grade
or higher while the Minnesota law covers all students from kinder-
garten on.' 76 Like the Minnesota law, however, the California stat-
169. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. at 1576.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01.41 (West 1991).
173. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127.46 (West Supp. 1994). All Minnesota school boards were
to institute sexual harassment policies by the beginning of the 1991 school year. Id.
174. Id.
175. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 212.5 (West Supp. 1994).
176. Shalit, cited at note 5, at 13. Sex-equity specialist for the Minnesota Department
of Education, Sue Sattel stated that "[Minnesota doesn't] believe that anyone should be
exempt from the range of discipline available to correct the situation." Id.
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ute requires the school districts to adopt and distribute written
sexual harassment policies.17 7 Also, the statute permits schools to
suspend or expel students who have sexually harassed other
students. '78
Additionally, in Minnesota, the Department of Human Rights 1 7
has thus far ruled against two school districts in cases involving
peer sexual harassment. In the first case, the plaintiff alleged that
the Duluth School District failed to paint over crude bathroom-
wall graffiti that was written about her.180 This case was settled in
1991 and the school district paid the plaintiff $15,000 in dam-
ages.1 81 Following this settlement, the state ruled against the
Chaska School District for failing to seriously address a complaint
by a female student that male students were circulating a list of
the twenty-five girls with whom they would like to have sexual in-
tercourse. 182 As a result of these cases, Minnesota school districts
are strictly enforcing the anti-discrimination statute to prevent
sexual harassment in their schools. ' 83
While California and Minnesota are the only states thus far to
have legislation covering peer sexual harassment, other states are
following suit. For example, Pennsylvania, on October 13, 1993, in-
troduced a bill that would require each school board to adopt writ-
177. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 212.6.
178. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.2 (West 1993).
179. The Department of Human Rights is the state agency that investigates com-
plaints and enforces compliance with the Minnesota sexual harassment legislation. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 363.05 (West 1991).
180. Katherine Lampher, Reading, 'Riting, and 'Rassment, Ms., May-June 1992, at 90,
90. The Duluth School District additionally agreed to "post a revised sexual harassment
policy in all schools, provide training for students and staff, and check bathroom walls daily
for graffiti." Id.
181. Jane Gross, Schools Are Newest Arenas for Sex-Harassment Issues, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1992, at B8.
182. Lampher, cited at note 180, at 90. This case is illustrative of the fact that commu-
nities and schools are failing to react to the sexually harassing behavior in a manner that
one would expect. In this case, the Chaska Herald wrote a story about the incidents alleged
in the plaintiff's complaint and the sexual harassment problem that existed at the school.
Sherer, cited at note 40, at 2141 n.119 (citing Doug Grow, Lessons of Harassment Also
Taught in Chaska, STAR-TRIB. (St. Paul, Minn.), Oct. 13, 1991, at 1B). The author of the
article wrote that the Human Rights Department had ruled that the school was negligent in
failing to take action against the boys who had circulated a list of the 25 most "fuckable"
girls. Id. The editor apparently used the obscenity to demonstrate to the readers the seri-
ousness of the situation. Id. However, most people were more outraged with the fact that
the editor used this word than with the fact that the female students had been harassed
everyday with this type of behavior. Id.
183. In the 1991-92 school year alone, more than 1000 students in Minneapolis were
suspended or expelled on sexual harassment charges. Shalit, cited at note 5, at 13.
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ten harassment policies.""
VII. AVOIDING LIABILITY: WHAT CAN A SCHOOL Do?
Absent state directive, a school may, on its own, adopt harass-
ment policies and procedures. By doing so, a school can limit or
possibly avoid liability under Title IX. Educational publications
have recommended tactics that school districts can use to avoid or
limit liability in employment related sexual harassment. While
these policies may not focus on peer sexual harassment, there is no
reason that they cannot be adopted, with minor modifications, to
assist schools in avoiding liability. Generally, it is suggested that a
school adopt a program that covers four main areas. 185
First, a school should adopt and publish a policy against sexual
harassment, including peer sexual harassment. 186  This policy
should contain several things. It should include a clear definition of
sexual harassment and give examples of actions that may consti-
tute peer sexual harassment. 87 The policy should communicate
that sexual harassment is against school policy and against the law
and that the school district will not tolerate any form of sexual
harassment.18 8 A detailed description of the internal "chain of
communication" for students to use in reporting harassment is a
184. Pa. H.B. 2185, 176th Gen. Assembly, § 5.4(d)(1) (1993). The bill provides that:
Each school board shall adopt a written harassment policy and sexual harassment
policy. This policy shall apply to pupils, teachers, administrators and other school
personnel, and shall include reporting procedures and disciplinary actions relating to
violations of the policy. The policy must be conspicuously posted in each school
building and included in each school's student handbook on school policies.
Id. The same bill was introduced to the General Assembly on December 9, 1991. Pa. H.B.
2255, 175th Gen. Assembly § 5.4(d)(1) (1991).
185. See Samuel J. Bresler & Rebecca Thacker, Four-point Plan Helps Solve Harass-
ment Problems, 2 EDUC. MGMT. GUIDELINES 1. (Pa. Sch. Boards Ass'n No. 19, Oct. 1993).
186. Bresler, cited at note 185, at 1; Lisa A. Brown & Kelly Frels, Investigating and
Preventing Claims of Sexual Harassment, INQUIRY & ANALYSIS 3 (Nat'l Sch. Board Ass'n
Council of Sch. Attorneys, July, 1992); Michael I. Levin, Keys to Eliminating Liability in
Sexual Harassment Suits, PA. SCH. BOARD Ass'N (Dec. 1992) at 30, 31.
187. Bresler, cited at note 185, at 1; Brown, cited at note 186, at 3. Bresler suggests
that the list should include, at a minimum, the following categories of conduct:
1. Physical assaults or other physical conduct of a sexual nature, including unwanted
touching.
2. Unwanted sexual advances, propositions or other sexual comments.
3. Displays or publications of a sexual nature anywhere in the [school].
4. Retaliatory action taken against a [student] for discussing or making a sexual har-
assment complaint.
Bresler, cited at note 185, at 2.
188. Bresler, cited at note 185, at 1; Brown, cited at note 186, at 3.
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must in any policy."8 9 Further, the school should designate a Title
IX coordinator who is in charge of investigating all complaints.1 90
Additionally, the school should clearly establish penalties, or a sys-
tem of penalties, that will be implemented if a student is found
guilty of sexually harassing another student.' 9' The policy should
contain deadlines for investigation, and forbid any retaliation
against the complainants and provide for penalties against those
who retaliate (i.e., the harassing students' friends or other class-
mates). 92 Finally, the policy should require the investigating offi-
cial to write a detailed report of the investigation. 9 ' This will serve
as proof of the fact that an investigation was conducted in the
event that a disgruntled student or parent decides to file suit.
Second, the school should develop a complaint procedure that
"encourages [students] to come forward with any harassment com-
plaints."'94 The procedure for filing a complaint should be in writ-
ing and should be distributed to the students, teachers, adminis-
trators, and those who are in charge of handling the complaints. 95
As stated above, the school should also place at least one person in
charge of Title IX complaints and this person's role should be
made known to all students, teachers, administrators, and staff.
Given the delicateness of the situation when young students are
involved, the school may want to designate a separate individual as
Title IX coordinator for students only and have a different person
in charge of Title IX and Title VII complaints involving
employees.1
9 6
189. Bresler, cited at note 185, at 2.
190. Brown, cited at note 186, at 3.
191. Bresler, cited at note 185, at 2; Brown, cited at note 186, at 3.
192. Brown, cited at note 186, at 3.
193. Id. at 3.
194. Bresler, cited at note 185, at 1. See also Brown, cited at note 186, at 3-5.
195. Bresler, cited at note 185, at 2.
196. The school should keep in mind, when placing a person in this role, that:
The person charged with this important responsibility should be tactful, considerate
and capable of making the complainant feel comfortable. Complaining about sexual
harassment is, for many, a painful and embarrassing experience. If the recipient of
the complaint is not able to provide a tactful, nonjudgmental investigation, accusers
may go outside the organization to file a complaint.
Bresler, cited at note 185, at 2-3. In choosing a Title IX coordinator, Bresler suggests that
school personnel should ask the following questions:
- Does the [person] have a hidden personal agenda (e.g., a previously harassed woman
may believe that all men accused of sexual harassment are guilty)?
- Has the (person] handled delicate situations well in the past . . . ?
Id. at 3. Additionally, the following questions should be asked:
- Is the person equipped to deal with the emotional and psychological effects that
1994
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Third, the school must develop and follow an investigative strat-
egy that immediately and fairly deals with harassment com-
plaints.197 This strategy should aim to quickly remedy the situation
and to protect the privacy of the students involved. 198 The investi-
gation should begin immediately after the complaint is filed and all
complaints must be investigated. 199 "The school official receiving
the complaint should not discourage or embarrass the complainant
and should not unilaterally decide that the complainant is unbe-
lievable or too unattractive to have been harassed."200 All evidence
should be collected, including any letters, notes, or photographs
and both the complainant and the accused should be inter-
viewed.2 0 ' During the interviews, the coordinator should focus on
the specifics, such as what was actually said or done, and not on
what either of the parties assumed.0 2 Finally, the investigator
should locate and interview any witnesses to the alleged harass-
ment, including staff, teachers and students.0 3
Following the investigation, prompt action should be taken if the
accused is found guilty. Additionally, if sexual harassment is found
not to have occurred, the coordinator should sit down with the stu-
dents, individually, and discuss what sexual harassment is and why
it did not occur or was found not to have occurred in that particu-
lar situation. Also, the accused student should be informed of pen-
alties that will be implemented should he or she retaliate against
the accusing student.
Finally, and most importantly, the school should institute an
educational program for students and employees alike.204 This pro-
gram should be geared toward the individual group involved. For
instance, with younger students, it may be helpful to use smaller,
more intimate groups, whereas with high school students or with
teachers and administrators larger groups may work better. Either
harassment has on young people?
* Is the person one the students feel comfortable with and trust?
Will the person be able to enforce penalties against guilty students?
* Is this person one who can handle irate and emotional parents?
* Can this person handle a potentially hostile community that may not agree with his
or her decision to reprimand the harasser?
197. Bresler, cited at note 185, at 1; Brown, cited at note 186, at 3-5.
198. Bresler, cited at note 185, at 1, 3; Brown, cited at note 186, at 3.
199. Bresler, cited at note 185, at 3; Brown, cited at note 186, at 3.
200. Brown, cited at note 186, at 3.
201. Id.; Bresler, cited at note 185, at 3.
202. Brown, cited at note 186, at 3.
203. Id. at 4.
204. Bresler, cited at note 185, at 3.
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way, each session should emphasize what sexual harassment is and
that it is both against the school policy and against the law. Addi-
tionally, at the end of each session, the students should be permit-
ted to ask questions of the instructors. It must be kept in mind
that it is only with adequate education that the students will come
to recognize and understand peer sexual harassment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the AAUW has stated: "Sexual harassment is clearly and
measurably taking a toll on a significant percentage of students'
educational, emotional, and behavioral lives."20 5 Given these ef-
fects, America can no longer choose to ignore peer sexual harass-
ment and action must be taken. While Title IX offers one alterna-
tive, its coverage of peer sexual harassment is uncertain and
alternative solutions need to be developed. The schools need to
take an active role in preventing and stopping sexual harassment.
This will be done most effectively through the development of pro-
cedures and policies aimed at ending sexual harassment. More im-
portantly, the schools need to institute educational programs for
students and faculty alike, for without education the procedures
and policies being promulgated are worthless.
On another level, state and federal legislatures need to adopt
strong anti-discrimination policies specifically aimed at sexual har-
assment in the educational context. While Title IX may afford
some protection to victims, the development of a strong body of
case law against student-to-student sexual harassment has barely
begun. It most likely will be years until the area is settled and
enormous amounts of time and money will be expended in the pro-
cess. In order to hasten this process, Congress must develop legis-
lation that will serve two purposes. First and foremost, any statute
aimed at preventing student-to-student sexual harassment must
have the best interests and protection of the students in mind.
Without this as its primary goal, any action by Congress will fall
short of ending the terror that is being inflicted on the children of
America. Second, the legislation should also keep in mind the well-
being and financial stability of the schools. If the schools are sub-
jected to unlimited liability for peer sexual harassment, their fi-
nancial status would be devastated. One must always keep in mind
that the schools need money in order to provide a solid education
to their students, and opening the schools up to extensive liability
205. HOSTILE HALLWAYS, cited at note 9, at 21.
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could severely cut back on the funds that are needed to support
the general educational process.
Absent legislative directive, whether state or federal, plaintiffs
must rely on Title IX for their .protection. As stated above, any
complaint filed under Title IX seeking to recover damages for stu-
dent-to-student sexual harassment needs to demonstrate three
things: (1) the existence of a hostile environment; (2) the lack of
appropriate and immediate action on the part of the school to end
the harassment; and (3) intentional discrimination on the basis of
sex. Whether other courts will follow the lead of Petaluma cannot
yet be determined; however, the general posture of the courts at
this time indicates that they will rely on Petaluma in further de-
veloping a body of law against student-to-student sexual
harassment.
No matter which method one prefers, it cannot be denied that
student-to-student sexual harassment is a pervasive problem in
America today, and that we, as a country, must take a stand
against it. "And although girls are experiencing more harassment-
-and suffering graver consequences--in the end, sexual harass-
ment is everyone's problem. For when children's self-esteem and
development are hampered, the repercussions echo throughout
society."206
Stacey R. Rinestine
206. Id.
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